SUMMARY: If law enforcement makes a promise in exchange for a statement, no matter how slight the promise, is sufficient alone to render the statement involuntary.
The law is clear that statements made in exchange for a promised, are not voluntarily made, and are inadmissible. This was made clear in Walker v. State, 771 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), which states:
"A confession or inculpatory statement is not freely and voluntarily given if it has been elicited by direct or implied promises, however slight. See Johnson, 696 So.2d at 330. Where there is an express quid pro quo, i.e., a promise of protection from prosecution for cooperation, the promise of leniency alone is sufficient to render a confession or inculpatory statement involuntary. See Bruno v. State, 574 So.2d 76, 79-80 (Fla.1991); see also Grasle v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D171, ___ So.2d ___, 2000 WL 201733 (Fla. 2d DCA Jan.12, 2000)."
The Florida Supreme Court Reiterated this in Blake v. State, 972 so.2d 839 (Fla. 2007) stating: "For example, confessions induced by promises not to prosecute or promises of leniency may render a confession involuntary. See, e.g., Samuel v. State, 898 So.2d 233, 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (finding a promise not to prosecute other fictional crimes rendered confession involuntary); Walker v. State, 771 So.2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ("Where there is an express quid pro quo, i.e., a promise of protection from prosecution for cooperation, the promise of leniency alone is sufficient to render a confession or inculpatory statement involuntary");see also Brewer v. State, 386 So.2d 232, 235 (Fla.1980)."
