Whether a Defendant's constitutional speedy trial rights have been violated is determined by the following 4 prong balancing test: 1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant has timely asserted his rights; and (4) the existence of actual prejudice as a result of the delay.
Murphy v. State, 351 so.3d 242 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2022)
Our court set forth the framework for considering claims of speedy trial violations in Seymour v. State, 738 So. 2d 984, 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999):
The constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches upon arrest, filing of an indictment or an information, or other official accusation. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982). Determining whether a violation of the constitutional right to speedy trial has occurred includes consideration of federal case law, especially Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), which identifies four guiding factors. See State v. Roundtree, 438 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Howell v. State, 418 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). These four factors are (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant has timely asserted his rights; and (4) the existence of actual prejudice as a result of the delay. No single factor is either necessary or determinative, but a balancing of the four factors must be done to reach a just conclusion. See Howell, 418 So. 2d at 1171, 1174; Roundtree, 438 So. 2d at 70.
This framework has been further expounded upon by the federal courts:
"[T]o trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from `presumptively prejudicial' delay...." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2690-91, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2192). "Only if this threshold point is satisfied may the court proceed with the final three factors in the Barker analysis." [United States v.] Clark, 83 F.3d [1350] at 1352 [(11th Cir. 1996)]. Delays exceeding one year are generally found to be "presumptively prejudicial." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S. Ct. at 2691 n.1; see also Clark, 83 F.3d at 1352. If, after the threshold inquiry is satisfied and the second and third factor are considered, all three of these factors weigh heavily against the Government, the defendant need not show actual prejudice (the fourth factor) to succeed in showing a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Doggett, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520.
United States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original).
